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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF SALT 
LAKE CITY, a public corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
Case No. 
BOTHWELL AND SWANER COM- I 10072 
PANY, a corporation, and FLOYD 
B. BOTHWELL, trustee, et al., 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case was originated by the Respondent in 1960 
by the filing of a complaint in the District Court of Salt 
Lake County to expropriate, by condemnation, lands of the 
Appellants. Issues relating to the proposed use being pub-
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lie in nature, the public necessity of the acquisition, the 
power of the Respondent to condemn the property of the 
Appellants and just compensation to be exacted for the 
expropriation were raised and submitted to trial. This 
appeal is prosecuted to review the several judgments made 
and entered by the trial court in the cause. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT 
Upon pre-trial hearing, the lower court entered its 
Judgment of Right to Condemn in favor of Respondent (R. 
51). Thereafter, upon trial of the issues of compensation 
and damages, the trial court entered its judgment against 
the Respondent and in favor of Appellants in the amount 
of $185,000.00; said judgment failed to provide for or car-
ry interest either before or after judgment. The Motion 
of Appellants for a new trial on questions of the right to 
condemn and compensation was, by the lower court, denied 
on the 16th day of January, 1964. After several ancillary 
hearings and upon motion of Respondent, the lower court 
entered its Judgment of Condemnation on the 3rd day of 
March, 1964, adjudicating the public use, the authority 
therefor, and vesting in Respondent the absolute title in 
and to the condemned premises of Appellants. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
It is submitted by this appeal that the judgment of the 
District Court entered on the verdict of the jury be re-
versed and the case remanded for new trial on the issues 
of value and compensation. 
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Additionally, it is contended that the judgment of con-
demnation of March, 1964, be reversed and the case be 
remanded to the lower court with instructions to dismiss 
the Respondent's complaint and the stated cause of action. 
In the event the reliefs requested above are denied, 
Appellants further seek judgment declaring their entitle-
ment of interest payable by the Respondent at the Statu-
tory rate from the date of entry of the judgment on the 
verdict to the date of the deposit of monies made by Re-
spondent. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The property of Appellants, as to which condemnation 
is sought, is described in the complaint of the Board of 
Education filed in April, 1960 (R. 2-3). A large tract, 
well known to inhabitants of Salt Lake City, the condemned 
premises is situated between Eighth South and Ninth South 
Streets in the City, the westerly property line thereof front-
ing upon Thirteenth East Street. The entire tract, prior 
to the taking, comprised some 157,383 square feet, of which 
the whole thereof was condemned (Tr. 26-29). For conven-
ience at trial, the portion of the property abutting upon 
13th East was referred to as Parcels A and B (Tr. 26-28), 
and the southeasterly segment, abutting upon Sunnyside 
Avenue on the north and 9th South Street on the south 
was denominated Parcel C (Tr. 28-29). As of the date of 
service of summons, Parcels A and B, comprising 74,356 
sq. ft. more or less, were subject to R-5 use zone of Salt 
Lake City, while tract C, encompassing 83,027 sq. ft. was 
zoned R-2 (Tr. 26-29, 52-54, 73). 
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The Appellants by their answer, denied the existence 
of a public use, raised the further questions of public 
necessity and lack of authority in law for the contemplated 
use and prayed for a dismissal on the merits, or as an al-
ternate, if such questions were resolved in favor of 
the Board, that just compensation be thereupon adjudged 
(R. 8-9,16-17, and 49-50). 
Relative to the preliminary issues, interrogatories were 
served upon and answered by the Board (R. 18-23); the 
response indicated the proposed use to be in furtherance 
of general "school needs", that the Board "had not made 
final plans" for the use of Appellants' property, but that 
an immediate need existed for the parking of 400 to 600 
automobiles (R. 20-21). Appellants' motion for summary 
judgment, founded upon the answers produced in discov-
ery, was denied upon pre-trial hearing (R. 51-52), and 
the Petition for interlocutory appeal lodged by Appellants 
to review such ruling was by this Court denied on Decem-
ber 7, 1962 (See Sup. Ct. Dock. 9777). Upon further pre-
trial hearings, the power of the Board to condemn the lands 
of Appellants was determined in the Respondent's favor 
(R. 56-57, 75-76) and the cause was thereupon set for trial 
by jury on the issues of value and compensation (R. 76-
78), damages having been deemed to have accrued as of 
June 28,1960 (R. 78). 
On November 18, 1963, a jury of eight was selected 
and the trial affecting the issues of value began by the 
presentation of Appellants' case in chief (Tr. 1-2, 24). It 
was the theory of the landowners' case that under applic-
able zoning regulations, the highest and best use of the 
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condemned portion zoned R-5, was multi-story apartments 
with a potential capacity of 315 apartment units (Tr. 49, 
54), the segment under R-2 zoning serving the collateral 
needs of auto parking (Tr. 55, 90). Further, that although 
the largeness in size and plottage of the entire tract made 
it highly desirable and unique among land similarly zoned 
within the City, market value was to be primarily gauged 
by an examination and analysis of the sale of other prop-
erties (Tr. 66, 67, 104, 112). 
Called as an evaluation witness for Appellants was 
Grant E. Nielsen. His qualifications to render an opinion 
on value were shown to be as follows: 
a. A senior member of the American Society of Ap-
praisers and President of the Utah Chapter (Tr. 
42,44); 
b. A realtor and broker in Salt Lake City since 1954 
(Tr. 44); 
c. A former general contractor and construction tech-
nician (Tr. 43); 
d. A former staff appraiser for the Utah State Tax 
Commission (Tr. 44); 
e. Had testified as an expert witness in the courts 
of Utah (Tr. 44); 
f. Had appraised all types of use properties (Tr. 44); 
g. Had been retained as a fee appraiser for such es-
tablished clients as State Road Commission, Kenne-
cott Copper Company, numerous school boards, 
utility companies and others (Tr. 45-46). 
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The witness, without objection rendered his opinion as 
to highest and best use of the condemned property (Tr. 
49). 
After identifying the topic tract and establishing his 
familiarity with it, he was asked his opinion of market 
value on the target date (Tr. 66). At that juncture, coun-
sel for the Board was permitted, over objection (Tr. 70), 
an unlimited 'Voir doir" examination directed to the basis 
of the witness' opinion (Tr. 66-71, 121-146) part of the 
questioning being conducted without the presence of the 
jury. Adduced at this examination, was the following tes-
timony: 
a. That the appraiser had considered numerous sales 
of other property, among them being three trans-
actions, which in his opinion, were comparable to 
the considered land zoned R-5 (Tr. 66, 69, 105-106, 
110,115,119); 
b. Sale No. 1 involved property at Fourth Avenue 
and B Street in Salt Lake City, took place in 1961, 
and was subject to R-5 zoning (Tr. 108-110); 
c. Sale No. 2 concerned land at South Temple and K 
Street in the City, was consummated in 1962, and 
was zoned R-5 (115-117); 
d. Sale No. 3 embraced property at 50 South Ninth 
East in the City, sale was made in 1962 and was 
subject to the same zone, R-5 (118-119); 
e. That in the appraiser's opinion, there had not been 
a substantial change in market prices for R-5 prop-
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erty between the date of evaluation, June 28, 1960, 
and 1961 or 1962, the dates of the sales elicited 
(Tr. I l l , 116, 135); 
f. The witness found no sales in 1960, which in his 
opinion, were comparable to the condemned tract 
(Tr. 137, 139); 
g. On cross-examination and without the presence of 
the jury, the witness acknowledged that other sales 
of R-5 property had been transacted in 1960 within 
the City, but that they were not sufficiently com-
parable, in his opinion, to be used (Tr. 127-133); 
h. That each sale examined was compared with the 
subject property for location, zoning, plottage, and 
time of sale and weight given to it accordingly (Tr. 
144); 
i. That the value of unimproved real estate is de-
termined by the market data or sales approach (Tr. 
104). 
After hearing such evidence, the trial judge found 
such testimony to be "wholly speculative", that only those 
sales "more favorable" and "more helpful" to the land-
owner were used by the witness to determine value and the 
judge thereupon refused to allow the opinion of Mr. Niel-
sen to go to the jury (See Tr. 146-147). 
Appellants then proceeded to call two additional wit-
nesses to testify on value (Tr. 163, 183), but upon objec-
tion of the Board, the testimony of each was rejected by 
the trial court as not having been founded upon proper 
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basis and the same excluded was from the jury (Tr. 181, 
190, 191). If received, the opinions of the witnesses prof-
fered, respectively, were $542,160.00 and $596,000.00 (Tr. 
175, 187). The landowners thereupon rested their case in 
chief without any evaluation testimony being placed before 
the trier of fact (Tr. 193). 
Subsequent to the Board calling its first expert wit-
ness, Appellants requested and were granted permission 
to reopen their case in chief to permit the testimony of one 
of the landowners, Roy Bothwell (Tr. 200). After a hear-
ing conducted without the presence of the jury, the witness 
testified that the condemned property was not "worth less 
than $525,000.00; absolute minimum, as to value" (Tr. 216). 
Upon objection of counsel for the Board, the witness was 
prohibited from explaining the basis of his conclusion 
(Tr. 217). The evidence of Mr. Bothwell was received as 
that of the landowner and not as a qualified and informed 
opinion on market value (Tr. 204-208, 217). 
The Board called two evaluation witnesses (Tr. 193, 
202). A number of R-5 and R-6 sales were adduced in sup-
port of their opinions, the date of such transactions rang-
ing from 16 months prior to the key date of evaluation (Tr. 
255) to four months succeeding (Tr. 309); only one sale 
was in the latter class. Over objection of Appellants' coun-
sel (Tr. 274), one of the Board's witnesses was permitted 
to render his opinion as to the market value of the prop-
erty zoned R-2 without having preliminarily produced any 
foundation therefor (Tr. 264-265). The Court received 
evidence from the Board's last witness that sales of R-2 
land transacted in January and July, 1958, as relevant and 
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comparable to the subject tract on the key date, June 28, 
1960 (Tr. 354). The value conclusions of the Respondent's 
witnesses were $155,500.00 and $179,000.00, respectively 
(Tr. 265, 312.) The verdict of the jury, returned into open 
court on the 22nd day of November, 1963, was $185,000.00 
(R. 134), and the judgment of the trial court thereon was 
entered the same day. 
On the 10th day of December, 1963, the Board filed 
with the Clerk of the District Court a notice depositing 
with said official the sum of $185,138.80 (judgment and 
costs) (R. 138-139). Appellants objected to such deposit 
and the amount thereof on the ground that the payment 
tendered did not include interest on the judgment from the 
date of its entry, November 23, 1963, to the date of deposit 
at the statutory rate of 8% per annum. Upon hearing, the 
objection was overruled and interest denied (R. 143). Not-
withstanding such order, the Board on January 2, 1964, 
filed an additional notice depositing ''under protest" the 
sum of $1,662.35, representative of interest at 8% from 
the date of judgment to the date of the additional deposit 
(R. 140-141). The Appellants have not made application 
to the lower court to withdraw or receive said moneys or 
any part thereof. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED PREJUDICIALLY 
IN PROHIBITING APPELLANTS' EVALUA-
TION WITNESS, NIELSEN, FROM RENDER-
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ING AN OPINION ON THE MARKET VALUE 
OF THE CONDEMNED PREMISES. 
(a) By the applicable standard, the witness was 
well qualified to testify on market value. 
At the trial on damages, Grant E. Nielsen, realtor and 
appraiser of Salt Lake City, was called as the Appellants' 
principal evaluation witness. Upon being sworn, the ex-
amination of the witness was at once directed to the gen-
eral qualifications of the witness (Tr. 42-48). In addition 
to an explanation of his education, training and experience 
in the real estate community, Nielsen testified that he was 
familiar with the condemned tract, that he had personally 
inspected and viewed it, that he had been requested to 
appraise the premises and that he had, in fact, formed an 
opinion of its market value as of June 28, 1960. 
Thereafter, Nielsen was asked his opinion as to the 
highest and best use of the considered property; he re-
sponded, without objection by the Board, that the best use 
was a "high-rise" multiple apartment site. Upon confirm-
ing this conclusion, the witness was asked for his opinion 
on market value. Thereupon, counsel for the Board, over 
objection, was allowed, under the pretense of voir doir, to 
conduct a searching cross-examination of the substantive 
basis for the expert's value opinion, specifically his analy-
sis of comparable sales. The net effect of this untimely and 
unfortunate interrogation was the trial court's declaration 
that the witness was not qualified to render an opinion: 
"It appears from his own testimony that his 
opinion, based upon comparables in 1962, would be 
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wholly speculative; would not be helpful to the jury 
in determining comparable values. For that reason, 
I am going to decline to permit the testimony to go 
to the jury, unless he further qualifies on this 
theory of comparable values." (Tr. 146.) 
Based on an erroneous hypothesis, Nielsen was ex-
cluded from testifying on market value. For the trial court 
to have so ruled was clear and unqualified error. The 
function of the trial judge in receiving or rejecting the 
opinion of a witness on market value is to adjudge, pre-
liminarily, the competency of the witness by his training, 
his educational achievements, his specialized knowledge of 
the field or domain under inquiry, and his practical ex-
perience in the real estate and appraisal business. Board 
of Regents of University of Arizona v. Cannon, 86 Ariz. 
176, 342 P. 2d 207 (1959); Shelby County v. Baker, 110 
So. 2d 896 (Ala. 1959). It is not his province to act as an 
arbiter of fact, or to weigh the merits of the opinion testi-
mony on a finely balanced scale; that assignment rests 
solely with the jury. Webb V. Olin Mathieson Chemical 
Corp., 9 U. 2d 275, 342 P. 2d 1094 (1959). Therein, it was 
said: 
«* * * When the subject under considera-
tion involves some aspects of science, art, trade, or 
learning about which the general knowledge of lay-
men is not sufficient to interpret and apply evi-
dence accurately in the finding of facts and draw-
ing conclusions, one who has acquired special knowl-
edge of the subject through study, or experience 
may be permitted to testify as an expert and give 
his opinions in regard to it. * * * 
«* * * So long as there is reasonable basis 
shown to justify the trial court's permitting the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
witnesses to testify as experts, the testimony is al-
lowed to come in as competent evidence. The quali-
fications of the witnesses then become one of the 
factors for the jury to consider in determining the 
weight to be given it." (Emphasis added.) 
Indeed, the presentation, by the witness, of his analysis 
of sales of other property, or the manifestation of the rea-
sons generally underlying his opinion, is not a condition 
precedent to the admissibility of an opinion. Such is the 
plain meaning of this Court's holding in State of Utah v. 
Tedesco, 4 U. 2d 248, 291 P. 2d 1028 (1956). For that 
matter, it was not until the decision in State of Utah v. 
Peek, 1 U. 2d 263, 265 P. 2d 630 (1953), that sales of com-
parable property were properly considered the subject of 
inquiry at all, on direct examination; prior thereto, it had 
been contended that questions relating to collateral sales 
were reserved for cross-examination. In rejecting Nielsen's 
testimony, the lower court disregarded the clear effect of 
Tedesco. 
The witness, Nielsen, on voir doir examination, stated 
that he had examined, was familiar with, and had analyzed 
a number of sales of other property, that he had utilized 
and considered three (3) transactions in particular, in ar-
riving at his opinion; as to the latter sales, the nature and 
dates of each were declared. Even had the witness failed to 
adduce one sale, his opinion, based upon general qualifica-
tions, should have been initially received for whatever 
weight the trier of fact might accord to it. Mai V. Garden 
City, 177 Kan. 179, 277 P. 2d 636; Dept. of Public Works 
V. Divit, 182 N. E. 2d 749 (111. 1962); State of Montana V. 
Peterson, 328 P. 2d 617 (Mont. 1958). The rule is set out 
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in Board of Regents of University of Arizona V. Cannon, 
86 Ariz. 176, 342 P. 2d 207 (1959) : 
"* * * It is true that there are other ele-
ments which may be used to determine market val-
ue, including a knowledge of the sales prices of 
other property similar in character and locality, but 
we know of no rule which requires the use of this 
element exclusively. If the witness testifying as to 
market value bases his opinion upon a recognized 
method of determining it which is of such a nature 
that it is not a matter of common knowledge, but 
results from special experience of training of the 
witness, his opinion in the matter may be regarded 
as expert. Upon cross-examination he may be ques-
tioned as to the extent of his knowledge of other 
elements, and lack of such knowledge would be a 
matter for the jury to consider in weighing the 
value of the testimony. * * *" (Emphasis ours.) 
Wigmore states the general maxim thusly: 
"A sufficient qualification is usually declared 
to exist where the witness is a resident, landowner, 
or farmer, in the neighborhood." 3 Wigmore on 
Evidence 44, Sec. 714 (3rd ed.). 
Nielsen brought to the trial an abundance of personal 
qualifications. President of the Utah Chapter of the Amer-
ican Society of Appraisers, former appraiser for the State 
Tax Commission, a realtor and broker in Salt Lake City 
for many years with an established appraisal clientel, Niel-
sen had qualified as an expert on market value in other 
suits of like nature. Once having elicited his training, edu-
cation, experience and knowledge of the subject property, 
all objections to his opinion on value went to the weight 
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rather than to its admissibility. Norman V. Utah Hotel 
Co., 60 Utah 52, 206 Pac. 556 (1922). 
It is elementary that the determination of whether a 
witness is competent to record his opinion on land value 
rests to a large extent, with the discretion of the trial court. 
Weber Basin Water Conservancy Dist. V. Nelson, 11 U. 2d 
253, 358 P. 2d 81; Graham V. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot 
Co., 79 Utah 1, 6 P. 2d 465. But a more important principle 
is that the decision of the trial judge will not stand on 
appeal if it is patent that prejudicial error was committed 
or his discretion was abused. Garr V. Cranney, 25 Utah 
193, 70 Pac. 853; Webb V. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 
supra; Douglas County V. Myers, 201 Or. 59, 268 P. 2d 625. 
Turner V. State Roads Comm. of Md., 213 Md. 428, 
132 A. 2d 455 (1957) is a case in point. Coates was called 
to testify in behalf of the landowners. He was an exper-
ienced realtor and broker of 20 years. On direct examina-
tion, the witness elicited four (4) sales of property which, 
in his opinion, were comparable to the property which the 
Roads Commission had condemned. The trial court ruled 
that the testimony was vague and general and refused to 
permit the appraiser to testify as to market value. The 
Maryland Court reversed the ruling of the trial judge and 
granted a new trial. In so doing, it declared: 
"This Court has long held that while the ad-
missibility of expert opinion evidence is largely 
within the discretion of the trial court, it is always 
subject to the review of the appellate court. * * * 
(citing authorities.) 
"We have concluded after a careful examina-
tion of the evidence that the trial court should not 
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have excluded the opinion evidence of Mr. Coates. 
* * * The evidence therefore shows not one 
sale, but at least four sales with the year of sale 
and sale price per acre. * * * We feel that 
both property owners were possibly harmed by be-
ing denied the right to present Mr. Coates' testi-
mony to the jury and that the exclusion of this evi-
dence constitutes reversible error" (Emphasis 
added.) 
In the case at bar, Nielsen testified of three (3) sales 
which in his opinion were probative. The facts herein sub-
stantially parallel those in Turner v. State Roads Comm. 
and, it is submitted, warrant and require the same treat-
ment as therein given, namely, a new trial. 
(b) Contention that the Court's ruling did not 
prevent the witness, Nielsen, from render-
ing an opinion (based on other grounds) 
is erroneous. 
It has been said that the ruling of the trial court bar-
ring Mr. Nielsen from imparting his opinion on market 
value to the jury did not foreclose an opinion based on 
general qualifications of the witness. At the hearing on 
Appellants' motion for new trial, the trial court remarked: 
"The court takes the view that market data 
comparability is a matter which the court must con-
sider in advance of testimony going to the jury. 
"If it isn't helpful, the jury shouldn't hear it. 
If it is so one-sided that the court does not consider 
it a helpful standard, it is the duty of the court to 
exclude it, but it wasn't the intention of the court 
to prohibit the witness from testifying from his 
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general knowledge, his general examination, his 
general opinion, as to values on the key date." 
(Trans, of Proceeding—December 23, 1963, p. 11.) 
There are at least two reasons why this statement af-
fords no panacea to the otherwise erroneous decision of the 
trial court in rejecting the opinion of Nielsen: 
1. The comparative sale (or market data) approach 
to market value is the paramount, the key, and 
pragmatically the only test which can be utilized 
in determining the market value of the condemned 
property (unimproved and non-income bearing). 
This approach hinges upon the application of the 
"willing buyer—willing seller" test adopted by this 
Court. Southern Pacific Co. V. Arthur, 10 U. 2d 
306, 352 P. 2d 693 (1960); State Road Comm. V. 
Hansen, 14 U. 2d 305, 383 P. 2d 917 (1963). Wit-
ness the statement appearing in the Appraisal 
Manual of the American Institute of Real Estate 
Appraisers: 
"The market data approach is essential in al-
most every appraisal of the value of real property. 
* * * 
"Why is market data good evidence of value? 
Because it represents the actions of users and in-
vesters. * * * The market data approach rec-
ognizes that the typical buyer will compare asking 
prices and work through to the best deal available. 
In the market data approach the appraiser is an 
observer of the buyer's actions." Appraisal of Real 
Estate, American Institute, pp. 68, 319 (3rd ed. 
1960). 
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2. If the lower court found that Nielsen's testimony, 
predicated upon a careful diagnosis of other sales, 
would not be "helpful" to the jury, how, it is 
queried, would an opinion founded on generalities 
be "helpful" ? The question provides its own an-
swer. 
The position taken by the trial court herein was raised 
and answered in Turner V. State Roads Coram, of Md., su-
pra, discussed above. After commenting upon action of the 
trial court in refusing to allow the witness, Coates, to tes-
tify on market value, the Court said: 
"Appellee insists that the court did not decide 
the witness could not qualify and the appellants 
should have proceeded further to qualify the wit-
ness. We do not agree. Counsel had drawn from 
the witness all information he had of comparable 
sales and the court reiterated his original opinion 
that Coates was not qualified. The excusal of the 
witness at this juncture cannot be considered as an 
abandonment to qualify him." 
The error of the trial court in preventing Nielsen from 
testifying on market value was prejudicial and warrants 
a new trial on compensation. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED PREJUDICIALLY 
IN DENYING ADMISSION IN EVIDENCE OF 
SALES OF COMPARABLE PROPERTY PROF-
FERED BY THE APPELLANTS. 
The witness, Nielsen, testified that upon his investiga-
tion of sales in the area, there were three (3) transactions 
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which he utilized and considered comparable. See Brief 
of Appellants, pp. 6, 7. In each instance, the sale was of 
property situated in Salt Lake City, subject to the same 
use zone as the condemned premises, and purchased for 
multiple-apartment construction. The dates of the transac-
tions were 1961 for Sale No. 1 and 1962 for Sales No. 2 
and No. 3. The trial court found the sales to be too far 
removed in point of time to be relevant, that the same 
were the product of a biased witness and refused to receive 
them as bearing upon market value as of June 28, 1960. 
This is the comment of the trial judge: 
"* * * Having taken only 1962 prices, and, 
without having considered anything in 1960, the 
court is of the view that he (Nielsen) considers the 
1962 prices more favorable to the land-owner here 
who called him to testify." 
Apart from the statement falling in the category of a 
commentary on the weight of the testimony and the credi-
bility of the witness, the decision to reject the sales as 
remote in time was prejudicial error. 
By a chain of decisions, the law is well established in 
this jurisdiction that sales of comparable property are ad-
missible as bearing upon market value, State of Utah V. 
Peek, 1 U. 2d 263, 265 P. 2d 630 (1953); State of Utah V. 
Tedesco, 4 U. 2d 248, 291 P. 2d 1028 (1956); Southern 
Pacific Co. V. Arthur, 10 U. 2d 306, 352 P. 2d 693 (1960); 
Weber Basin W. C. Dist. V. Ward, 10 U. 2d 29, 347 P. 2d 
862 (1959); State of Utah V. Peterson, 12 U. 2d 317, 
366 P. 2d 76 (1961); State of Utah V. Woolley, 
et ux., 15 U. 2d , 390 P. 2d 860 (1964), and their use 
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is now common practice in the trial of land condemnation 
suits. 
Each of the sales proffered by the witness, Nielsen, 
was consummated subsequent to the date of value in the 
case. This should cause no alarm nor should that fact ren-
der them inadmissible. The preferred and majority rule 
supports the introduction of similar sales of property, made 
before or after the taking, which have a reasonable rela-
tionship to the status of the market at the date of assess-
ment of value. Hance V. State Roads Comm. of Md., 221 
Md. 164, 156 A. 2d 644; U. S. V. 63.04 Acres of Land, 245 
F. 2d 140 (2 C. A., 1957). In Dorfmann V. State of New 
York, 4 A. D. 2d 979, 167 N. Y. S. 2d 760, the admissibility 
of a sale made two years after the date of acquisition was 
approved and it was said by the New York Court: 
"It seems reasonably clear that the sale was 
made in good faith and in the ordinary course of 
business. We find no case precisely in point where 
testimony was received of a sale two years after 
an appropriation but sales made prior to an approp-
riation for an even longer period of time have been 
approved (Village of Lawrence v. Greenwood, 300 
N. Y. 231, 90 N. E. 2d 53). The rule in Massa-
chusetts is that testimony of after sales within a 
reasonable time is admissible and we see no good 
reason why the same rule should not apply in this 
state, (citing authorities.)" 
This Court has not had occasion to pass upon the 
question, pointedly, although the sales under consideration 
in State Road Comm. v. Peterson, 12 U. 2d 317, 366 P. 2d 
76, were transacted subsequent to the date of evaluation. 
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(a) It could not be said that sales occuring two 
years after the date of value were, as a 
matter of law, so remote as to have no pro-
bative value. 
There is no magic standard by which a comparable 
sale is determined. A host of factors, inclusive of size, 
shape, zoning, and proximity of time and location, are to 
be considered; the best that can be said is that compara-
bility is dependent upon the conditions and circumstances 
of each situation. 5 Nichols on Eminent Domain 439, Sec. 
21.31 (3rd ed.). The time of sale, as an element itself, is 
of moment in ascertaining whether the market conditions 
between the two dates have fluctuated or substantially 
changed. If such conditions have maintained a relative 
consistency, the proffered sale should be admitted. Weber 
Basin W. C. Dist. V. Ward, 10 U. 2d 29, 347 P. 2d 862; City 
of Chicago V. Vaccarro, 408 111. 587, 97 N. E. 2d 766. Placed 
in the negative: 
"Remoteness in point of time, however, will 
condemn the evidentiary value of a sale only where 
there has been such a change in conditions during 
the interval as to make the sale an unreliable test 
of value." 5 Nichols on Eminent Domain 452, Sec. 
21.31(2) . 
The witness for Appellants, Nielsen, testified that with 
respect to comparable Sales Nos. 1, 2, and 3, there had 
been no measurable shift of the market between the date 
of condemnation (1960) and that of the respective sales 
(1961 and 1962) (Tr. 112, 116, 135). Furthermore, Niel-
sen stated that his investigation did not disclose any sales 
during 1960 which, in his opinion, were similar to the 
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condemned tract (Tr. 137-139); at this point in the trial, 
such testimony was undisputed as the Board had not yet 
gone forward with its case. The foundation for time of sale 
was therefore amply satisfied for the admission of each 
of the proffered sales brought forth by Mr. Nielsen. 
In rejecting the sales, the trial court expressed appar-
ent concern over the remoteness of time involved. That 
factor, standing alone, is of little consequence. Sales made 
five years or more have been received, Taylor v. State 
Roads Comm., 224 Md. 92, 167 A. 2d 127 (1961); Holcombe 
V. City of Houston, 351 S. W. 2d 69 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961), 
and a trial court was held to have abused its discretion in 
rejecting sales made three years before the key date. Hous-
ing Authority of City of Little Rock v. Sparks, 234 Ark. 
868, 355 S. W. 2d 166 (1962). Remoteness in time goes 
not to the admissibility of the proffered sale, but rather 
to its weight. Thus, in approving the use of a sale made 
six and one-half years from the date of value, this Court 
said: 
"While we recognize that if a prior sale is too 
remote in point of time, and changed conditions 
have intervened so that the trial court thinks the 
evidence has no probative value, he may sustain the 
objection, we do not regard the instant situation as 
falling within the classification. * * * The 
more remote the time of the prior sale the less pro-
bative value it may have on the immediate situation, 
but that goes to the weight of the evidence and not 
its competency or its relevance/' (Emphasis ours.) 
Weber Basin W. C. Dist. V. Ward, 10 U. 2d 29, 347 
P. 2d 862 (1959). 
Any misgivings that the trial court may have had as 
to the sales proposed by Appellants went to their weight 
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and value, not the admissibility thereof. That the trial 
court was in doubt about the accuracy of its ruling is evi-
dent from the transcript. After hearing all the evidence 
including that of the Board, the court, on its own motion, 
stated that it would permit Nielsen to testify on market 
value, utilizing the proposed 1961 sale (No. 1 herein) as 
a premise (Tr. 394, 395). After argument, the court re-
versed the prior pronouncement and held to its initial de-
cision denying the admission of the opinion and sales of 
Mr. Nielsen and denied Appellants' motion to reopen their 
case in chief: 
"The court having reconsidered the ruling 
stated just prior to recess now believes that an 
opinion by Mr. Nielsen based upon one comparable 
would not be sound or justified or helpful to the 
jury." (Tr. 398.) 
In so doing, the trial court, again, indulged in the 
weighing of evidence, the credibilty of the witness and the 
relative merits of Nielsen's opinion. Such constitutes preju-
dicial error. 
The Board of Education did not witness the diffi-
culty experienced by Appellants in the presentation of its 
evaluation witnesses. Firstly, the trial court reversed its 
ruling that sales be introduced prior to the witness render-
ing his opinion; the matter of sales and their validity, it 
was said, was for cross-examination (Tr. 264, 265). Sec-
ondly, the Board introduced into evidence sales of property 
zoned R-2, which were transacted in January and July, 
1958 (Tr. 354). If the trial court was concerned about the 
remoteness of time accompanying the sales offered by Ap-
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pellants, 1958 sales offered by Respondent should have 
caused equal anxiety. 
Although the determination of comparability rests in 
the first instance, within the discretion of the trial court, 
State of Utah V. Peek, 1 U. 2d 263, 265 P. 2d 630 (1953), 
that discretion, if found to be erroneous or abused, will 
be overturned. In Weber Basin W. C. Dist. V. Ward, 10 U. 
2d 29, 347 P. 2d 862 (1959), the trial court excluded a sale 
of the condemned tract made six and one-half years prior 
to the date of value. Such exclusion was found to be in 
error, and served as a ground for the cause being remanded 
for new trial. See also Housing Authority of City of Little 
Rock V. Sparks, 234 Ark. 868, 355 S. W. 2d 166 (1962) 
and Thompson V. State of Texas, 319 S. W. 2d 368 (Tex. 
1958). 
It is submitted that reasonable minds could not differ 
that the sales proposed and offered by Appellants were, 
in law, comparable, that the objections thereto went to 
their weight and not admissibility and that the trial court 
erred in refusing to receive the same. 
POINT III. 
BY THE REFUSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT 
TO ADMIT THE TESTIMONY AND EVI-
DENCE OFFERED BY THE LANDOWNERS, 
A P P E L L A N T S WERE DENIED A FAIR 
TRIAL. 
(a) The sole evaluation testimony admitted was 
that of the landowner, himself. 
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The Appellants, as landowners in condemnation, are 
entitled to be compensated justly for the expropriation of 
their property by the Board of Education. Art. 1, Sec. 22, 
Utah Constitution; Shurtleff V. Salt Lake City, 96 Utah 
21, 82 P. 2d 561; 78-34-10 (1) U. C. A. 1953. This requires 
a fair trial, free from prejudicial error. 
The transcript of the testimony and evidence is un-
deniable that the error committed by the trial court, as 
outlined in Points I and II of this Brief, worked to the 
real prejudice of the Appellants. The aftermath of the 
lower court's rulings excluding the testimony and opinion 
of Nielsen, was that the landowners, who carry to the trial 
the burden of proof, Tanner V. Provo Bench Canal & Irr. 
Co., 40 Utah 105, 121 Pac. 584, failed in their effort to 
place in evidence any testimony on market value. Not one 
scintilla of expert evidence reached the trier of fact in 
behalf of Appellants during the trial. 
Only after the Board of Education had opened its main 
case were the Appellants permitted the opportunity of 
reopening their case for the limited purpose of calling one 
of the landowners, Roy Both well (Tr. 200). That testimony 
was received not as an opinion from one who had made an 
informed analysis of the market or as that of a qualified 
appraiser, but in the empty vacuum of a landowner, af-
fected by bias and special interest. His lay statement that 
the "property wasn't worth less than $525,000.00; absolute 
minimum, as to value" was of no significance. Practically, 
the Appellants' case was void of evidence. In light of this, 
it is small wonder that the verdict of the jury was barely 
$6,000.00 above the evaluation testimony of the Board of 
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Education, $179,000.00. The resulting prejudice requires 
that Appellants be accorded a new trial. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED PREJUDICIALLY IN 
DENYING TO APPELLANTS INTEREST AT 
THE STATUTORY RATE OF 8% PER ANNUM 
FROM THE DATE OF JUDGMENT ON THE 
VERDICT UNTIL THE DATE OF DEPOSIT 
MADE BY THE RESPONDENT. 
On November 22, 1963, judgment on the verdict of the 
jury was rendered in favor of Appellants and against the 
Board of Education for the sum of $185,000.00; said judg-
ment failed to specify that interest was due and owing at 
8% from the date of judgment until the same was paid or 
until a statutory deposit was made (R. 134). Appellants 
objected to the December 10, 1963 Deposit of Judgment, 
made by the Board on the ground that the same did not 
include interest from the date of judgment. Upon hearing, 
the trial court found that a judgment of condemnation is 
not of the same nature as ordinary money judgments, that 
interest was not owing, and thereupon overruled the ob-
jection (Proc. of Dec. 23, 1963, p. 30, R. 143). The lower 
court erred by the order. 
Questions of entitlement of interest in condemnation 
suits have been before this Court. The cases of Oregon 
Short Line R. Co. V. Jones, 29 Utah 147, 80 Pac. 732 and 
Salt Lake & U. R. Co. V. Schramm, et al., 56 Utah 53, 189 
Pac. 90 (1920) have established the principle that interest 
at the normal rate of 6% per annum is not due upon the 
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filing of a complaint in condemnation but is exacted prior 
to judgment, only in the event that the condemning agency 
possesses the property, pendente lite, under an order of 
occupation. Again, in State of Utah v. Peek, 1 U. 2d 263, 
265 P. 2d 630, the Court declared that the condemnee is not 
entitled to the recovery of interest from the date of service 
of summons, there being no taking in law, even though the 
demised premises are vacant and nonproductive. State 
Road Comm. V. Danielson, et al, 122 Utah 220, 247 P. 2d 
900 (1952), provides that in those instances wherein the 
condemnor does obtain occupancy pendente lite, of the 
condemned tract, the lawful rate of interest is 6% from 
the date of the order of immediate occupancy to the "date 
of judgment". The singular issue (whether interest is ow-
ing upon the judgment in condemnation at 8% from the 
date of entry until paid or satisfied) raised by this appeal 
has not been directly before the Court. 
The judgment on the verdict entered by the trial court 
on November 22, 1963, decreed a sum certain due the Ap-
pellants from the Board of Education. Its recitals were 
consistent with other money judgments at law ordinarily 
entered by a court of this State in an adversary proceed-
ing. Like other judgments at law, it carries interest at 
8% per annum from the date of entry. The statute relating 
to the payment of interest is the touchstone of the issue: 
"Interest on judgments. — Any judgment ren-
dered on a lawful contract shall conform thereto and 
shall bear the interest agreed upon by the parties, 
which shall be specified in the judgment; other 
judgments shall bear interest at the rate of eight 
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per cent per annum." 15-1-4 U. C. A. 1953, as 
amended. 
The statute circumscribes all in personam judgments. 
McFarlane V. Winters, 114 Utah 149, 211 P. 2d 981 (1949). 
The single exception made to the "eight percent" rule is 
on judgments arising out of actions in contract. Under 
the time-honored principle of statutory construction, ex-
pressio unius est exclusio alterius, the legislative intent, 
by implication, prescribes that compensation judgments in 
condemnation bear interest at 8 percent until paid or until 
a statutory deposit is effected. 
In State Road Comm. V. Danielson, et ah, 122 Utah 
220, 247 P. 2d 900 (1952), it was contended that the stat-
ute above-quoted (then codified as 44-0-4) was applic-
able from the date of occupancy by the condemning agency. 
This Court rejected that argument, but in so doing, de-
clared that the statute, now 15-1-4 U. C. A. 1953, was ap-
plicable from the time that damages in condemnation are 
determined. The Court, writing through Wolfe, C. J., said: 
"Admittedly, the amount of the damage sus-
tained by the condemnee is not determined prior 
to the entering of the order but is left for later 
determination. Until such time as damages are de-
termined, it is clear that there is no judgment which 
will bear interest within the meaning of Sec. 44-
0-4." 
The alter ego of this rule is that upon determination of 
damages and compensation and entry of judgment thereon, 
the statute is operative. In Danielson, the judgment of the 
trial court specified interest at 8% from occupancy by the 
State of Utah until paid (Supreme Court No. 7752). By 
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its opinion, this Court found error only to the extent that 
interest was awarded "to the date of judgment". Interest 
at 8% from the entry of judgment until payment thereof 
was permitted to stand. 
The rule set forth in Danielson is in harmony with the 
weight of authority. In 29 C. J. S. 1380, Eminent Domain 
Sec. 333a, it is written: 
"Generally interest on the award is allowed and 
judgments in condemnation proceedings have been 
held to be within the meaning of statutes providing 
for interest on judgments generally." 
The significance of the trial court's ruling in this 
matter extends far beyond interests of the parties hereto. 
Counsel for Appellants are informed that the great bulk 
of condemning authorities in the State of Utah have in-
terpreted the statutes and decisions of this Court as re-
quiring the payment of interest at 8% on condemnation 
judgments and have, in fact, paid such interest for many 
years last past. If this Court determines that interest is 
not due and payaHe as herein contended and advanced, it 
is submitted that it should also declare whether such ruling 
has retroactive application to other causes wherein inter-
est has been paid. 
It is submitted that the trial court committed error 
in overruling Appellants' objection to the Deposit made by 
the Board of Education, and that the judgment of Novem-
ber 22, 1963, should carry interest at 8% until the Deposit 
of Judgment was made. 
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POINT V. 
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION FAILED TO 
ESTABLISH EXISTENCE OF THE PUBLIC 
NECESSITY FOR THE APPELLANTS' PROP-
ERTY, OR THAT THE PROPOSED USE WAS 
ONE PUBLIC IN NATURE. 
Through discovery processes, the Board made known 
the use it proposed to make of the Appellants' property— 
general school needs and parking area for automobiles (R. 
20-22). Plans for actual use had not been finalized. At 
the pre-trial hearing in September, 1962, Appellants' coun-
sel moved for summary judgment of dismissal on the 
ground that immediate need was not evidenced and that 
parking area was not an authorized public use. The pre-
trial court denied the motion and Appellants, to review 
that Order, filed a petition for interlocutory appeal with 
this Court; the same was also denied. At a subsequent pre-
trial proceeding in May, 1963, it was stipulated between 
the Board and Counsel for landowners that the issue of the 
power to condemn had been resolved in favor of the public 
agency (R. 75). The order of pre-trial entered upon the 
stipulation confirmed the power to condemn the lands of 
Appellants and provided that from the order, the right of 
appeal did not exist. Because present counsel did not rep-
resent the Appellants at that time, it is necessary to in-
terpret the language adopted in said Order as to its con-
tent and meaning. With respect to that, present counsel 
for Appellants believe this was intended: 
1. it was understood by Mr. McCulloch, then 
counsel, that the question of the Board's 
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power to condemn had been determined ad-
versely to Appellants at the September, 
1962 hearing; and therefore, 
2. no further issue would be raised as to that 
point in the lower court. 
The waiver of Appellants' right of appeal is less trouble-
some. It is a general rule that although the right of ap-
pellate review may be waived by a litigant, that so funda-
mental is that right to the judicial system and due process 
of law, the waiver must be supported by adequate consid-
eration. Curry V. Bacharach, 271 Pa. 364, 117 Atl. 435 
(1921). The record does not reveal the existence of any 
such consideration. 
The power of condemnation must be underwritten by 
satisfying statutory conditions. Specifically, the proposed 
use must be authorized by law and public in nature. 78-
34-1 and 4, U. C. A. 1953; State Road Comm. v. Denver & 
Rio Grande W. R. Co., 8 U. 2d 236, 332 P. 2d 926 (1958). 
The declared public improvement must be located in a 
manner compatible with the greatest public good and the 
least private injury. 78-34-5 U. C. A. 1953. Lastly, the 
need of the property condemned must be immediate. A 
default by the condemnor in meeting any of these require- • 
ments should result in the condemnation complaint being 
dismissed. 
The Board of Education did not satisfy its burden of 
proof with respect to these issues. The case of Wineger 
et al. V. Aires, 371 Pa. 242, 89 A. 2d 521 (1952) is a ready 
response to a school board who enters the real estate mar-
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ket to condemn without evidencing a public need for edu-
cational facilities. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court committed prejudicial error in refuse 
ing to permit the opinion testimony of Grant E. Nielsen, 
witness for Appellants, on market value and in rejecting 
the proffered sales of comparable properties elicited by the 
said witness. Appellants were prejudiced by said rulings 
and prevented from establishing their case on market value 
of the condemned premises. This Court should remand the 
case to the lower court for a new trial on the issues of 
compensation. 
The lower court committed prejudicial error in holding 
that the Board of Education was entitled to condemn and 
expropriate the property of Appellants on the showing 
made. 
The trial court erred in law in failing to prescribe that 
the judgment on the verdict carried interest at the statu-
tory rate of 8% per annum. This court should rectify such 
ruling by requiring the payment of such interest from the 
date of judgment to the date that deposit of judgment was 
tendered. 
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